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CREATION OF EASEMENTS BY EXCEPTION

JOSEPH WARREN MADDEN*

In a recent issue of another legal periodical the writer participated in an effort to show that, in a conveyance of land, it
should be legally permissible for the grantor to save to himself,
by the process of exception, an easement, profit, or other servitude
in the land conveyed." The specific problem of that discussion
was to determine by what process, based upon what theory, A,
the owner of land, could convey a part of his land to B, and keep
for himself an easement or other servitude in the land. It was
pointed out that this purpose could not be accomplished by a
technical reservation, since a reservation properly applies only to
cases of things issuing out of the land, such as "rents, heriots,
suits of mill, and suits of court," and does not apply to the servitudes most commonly created, such as easements and profits. It
was also pointed out that the legal requirements of a re-grant from
B to A of the interest in question are not, ordinarily, satisfied
by the parties. For example, it would be necessary that the conveyance be signed by the grantee, which is not often (lone, and
also, except where the rule has been changed by statute, that the
word "heirs" be used in order to give the grantor an interest more
permanent than for his own life. The conclusion was reached,
that if the desired result could be accomplished by treating the interest in question as the proper subject of an exception, the intent of the parties could nearly always be given full effect, and
dangerous pitfalls in conveyancing would be avoided.
A theory whs then proposed upon the interest which A sought
for himself could be treated as the proper subject of an exception.
Suppose the interest were a right of way. While A still owned
all the land, he could of course, pass over it wherever he pleased.
That was one of the many incidents of his ownership. When we
* Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
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recall that the law is not concerned with land as a physical thing,
but only with the legal incidents which attach to the land, would
it not be possible for the law to permit one to pass, by his conveyance, all of those legal incidents except the one in question,
keeping that one in himself, as, of his forner estate in it, untouched by his conveyance, just as a physical part of the land
excepted out of the conveyance, Would be untouched by it? Upon
this theory, if A should by a deed poll convey Blackacre to B
"excepting (or reserving) 2 a right of way ten feet wide along
the north side of the tract conveyed," A would have without question the easement in fee which was plainly intended by the parties.
The previous discussion of the subject made no attempt at an
examination of the decided cases. The purpose of this discussion
is to examine the cases which have arisen in Massachusetts, the
jurisdiction where, in the opinion of the writer, the cases have
occurred in such numbers and in such variety as to their facts,
that they furnish a fairly complete subject upon which to test
the operation of the rule proposed in the former discussion. The
fact that in several of the cases decided in Massachusetts, a limited
application of the suggested rule has been made, also tends to make
the Massachusetts cases especially suitable as a basis for this discussion.
The earliest case which an examination of the Massachusetts
Reports has disclosed is that of White v. Crawford.8 In that case
White, by a deed poll conveyed to Swanton a tract of land, the
deed containing the following language:
"N.B. It is agreed, before signing, that the said White or
his heirs is forever to have privilege of a road to pass and repass from the highway, (indicating the route), across to his
own land."
The court held that the plaintiff, a devisee of all of White's real
estate, had the way after White's death. The court noticed the
fact that there was a way in use by White before his grant and
construed the words quoted above as an exception. The court
was not required to decide whether the right was appurtenant to
the premises retained by the grantor, or in gross, but was prepared to hold, if necessary, that it was appurtenant. At other
points in the case the court speaks of the words as constituting
a reservation, an exception, or a grant, using the words without
discrimination.
2 The courts do not hesitate to translate the word "reserve" into the word
"except" where the 'subject matter Is proper for an exception. Whitaker v. Brown,
46 Pa. 19T (1863) ; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278; Freudenberger Oil Co. v.
Simmons, 83 S. D. 995 (W. Va. 1914).
3 10 Mass. 183 (1813).
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In Atkins v. Bordman,4 the grantor in a deed-poll, "reserves
to himself, his heirs, and assigns forever," a right of way by a specified route over the premises granted to other land of the grantor.
The way had been in use before the conveyance. It was held that
the plaintiff, who was a successor in title of the grantor, had
the right of way, and could enforce it against the defendant, a
successor in title of the original grantee. The court in these cases
uses the word "reservation," but this language should be noted:
"He (the grantor) may reserve out of the estate granted, and annex to his own estate retained, such easements as he may deem
proper." It is submitted that the court was thinking in terms
of exception, when it used that language.
In Mendell v. Delano,5 A, the owner of a fractional interest in
a wharf conveyed that interest to B, "Reserving to myself, my
heirs and assigns, to pass to and from said wharf to my tract on
the north side of said wharf." The interest of B passed to H,
and the land on the north passed to J. In an action by J against
H for obstructing the way the judgment was for the plaintiff.
The court speaks of the words quoted as a reservation, throughout the opinion.
In these several early cases it was held, without discussion,
that an easement, such as a right of way, might in the circumstances here under discussion be created in favor of the grantor,
by words of reservation in a deed not executed by the grantee.
The court did not determine whether the easement arose by way
of exception, in the manner suggested in this discussion,6 or by
way of reservation, through a broadening of the scope of the
word "reservation," to include the creation of easements as well
as rents and the limited number of other rights to which the
word is limited by the English courts.
In the case of Bowen v. Conner,7 the defendants and plaintiffs
were tenants in common of a lot and, upon a division, the plaintiff quitelaimed to the defendant the southerly portion of the
lot "reserving forever a right of way" by a specified route over
the portion conveyed. No words of perpetuity were used in the reservation, except the word "forever."
The plaintiff later sued the
defendant, in an action on the case, for the obstruction of the way.
The court held that, under the circumstances, without any express
words of reservation, the plaintiffs would have had a way of
necessity over the tract conveyed. But the court further said:
20 Pick. (Mass.) 291, (1838),
7 =et (Mass.) 176 (1843).
a 38 R~aV. L. 1fV. 180.
6 Cush. (Mass.) 132 (1850).
'

S. C. 2 Met. (Mass.) 457 (1841).
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The court reasoned thus:
"Upon principle it appears to us that this right, plainly intended by both parties to be secured to the plaintiffs, can be
legally secured in the manner adopted in this deed, treating the
right reserved as an exception."
"Prior to those deeds, the plaintiffs, as tenants in common,
had a right to pass over every part of this land at their pleasure.
And each tenant in common had the entire right, though he had
not the entire fee. When, therefore, the grantors conveyed the
front lot, they restricted themselves from any further right
to pass over the whole and every part, and limited themselves
to the strip thirty feet wide, specially described. This was a
part of the right previously enjoyed, and this they excepted
out of the grant."
The court said, in an earlier part of the opinion:
"As to the nature of that right (the right of way claimed
by the plaintiffs), if one was well created, considering the circumstances, and construing the deeds together, we think it was
a right secured to the plaintiffs, and their assigns, as owners
of the rear lot,, and therefore was a right of way annexed to the
estate before owned in common, but then set off in severalty to
the plaintiffs. " 9
This last quoted statement is dictum, since the grantors themselves were plaintiffs, but it indicates plainly that the court considered that a right of way in fee simple, appurtenant to the tract
retained, had been created by exception. It should also be observed, in connection with a later part of the discussion, that the way
in question was not in use at the time of the severance, it appearing that the obstruction complained of was in place at the time
of the conveyance.
In the case of Stockbridge Iron Company v. Hudson Iron Company, the grantor, in a deed poll of land containing an ore-bed,
"reserved" "the right of mining on the granted premises" a
certain, quantity of ore annually, at a certain duty per ton. It was
claimed by the grantee that the parties intended to insert in the
deed a limitation of the grantor's right to mine to an amount of
ore sufficient to supply certain furnaces, but that by mutual
mistake such limitation had been omitted, and the grantee filed
a bill lraying for a declaration of the rights of the parties under
the deed. The defendant, the grantor, pleaded the statute of
frauds. The court took the position that if the words relating to
the mining right were words of exception, then it was not covered
by the writing at all, and hence the statute of frauds would preSee 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132 at 136.
. See 6 Cush. (Mass.) 132 at 134.
20 107 Mass. 290.
s
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vent a court of equity from broadening the deed to include the
additional subject. But if the words in question were words of
reservation, then the effect of the reformation would be to narrow
the re-grant from the grantee to the grantor, and the statute of
frauds would be no obstacle. The court, at page 321, said:
"The court are of opinion that the clause in the deed from the
defendant to the plaintiff corporation must be construed as a
reservation of new rights to the grantor, out of the granted
premises; or else as the creation of such new rights by force of
words of reservation, taking effect either by way of estoppel,
or as a grant from the grantee by implication of law from the
acceptance of the deed."
The court held that the statute of frauds was no bar to the plaintiff's contention. It should be noted that, at the time of the conveyance in question, the grantor was taking ore from the premises,
and manufacturing it in the furnaces, to the supply of which the
grantee sought by his bill to limit the grantor. It should also
be noted that the "reservation" was only to the grantor, (a corporation) and contained no words of succession or limitation.
If the suit had been against an alienee of the grantor this last
point would have been of importance, as we shall see.
Is the mining right involved in this case to be treated differently from the right of way involved in Bowen v. Conner?" To
paraphrase the language of that case:
"Prior to this deed the grantors had the right to mine ore
from every part of this land at their pleasure..... .This was
a right previously enjoyed, and this they excepted out of the
grant.) t
To support the clause in question as a reservation it is necessary
to extend the common law meaning of reservation, since, by the
English law, the only subjects of reservation were "rents, heriots,
suit of mill and suit of court."' 2 However, it is not logically impossible to bring easements and profits within the scope of the
ancient definition of a reservation as vesting "in the grantor in
the deed some new right or interest not before existing in him."' 3
though it seems rather late in the day for this innovation. If
this change in the law would solve any considerable proportion of
the cases and bring about the fulfillment of the intent of the
parties, the historical inaccuracy could be overlooked. But it is
doubtful whether such a broadening of the scope of the term
1 BSura, n. 6.
22 Sura, n. 6.
is SiEP. ToUcaSToNE 80.
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"reservation" would satisfactorily solve many of the cases, and
it would certainly raise troublesome questions about the necessity
for the term: "heirs," or similar words to indicate the durability of
the estate.
In Dennis v. WiLson,"4 A conveyed land to B, "excepting and reserving a right of way to pass and repass over said land, with
teams and otherwise, on the northerly side of said premises, not
exceeding eight rods from said old Worcester road." A retained
premises adjoining the granted premises, which retained
premises he later sold to C. During the life of A, B obstructed
the way, and C sued B in tort because of the obstruction. The
court held that the way "excepted and reserved" was appurtenant to the premises retained by A and later conveyed to C, the
plaintiff, because that was the "apparent purpose" of the way.
The court did not find it necessary to decide whether the way was
created by exception or reservation, since the original grantor was
still living, and even though the way would expire with his life,
for want of words of limitation in the "reservation" as it would
according to the Massachusetts rule if it should be considered
as a reservation, still the plaintiff could recover. It does not
appear whether or not the way in question was in use at the time
of A's conveyance to B.
In the case of Ashcroft v. Eastern Railroad,1 Lovejoy in 1837
conveyed to the defendant railroad a strip of land, and inserted
in the deed this language:
"Reserving to myself the right of passing and repassing, and
repairing my aqueduct logs forever through a culvert six feet
wide and rising in height to the super structure of the railroad
to be built and kept in repair by said company.'
The deed further specified the location of said culvert. The culvert was built and the right enjoyed by Lovejoy and his grantees
of his adjoining land until 1870, when the culvert was obstructed
and the aqueduct destroyed by the defendant. Lovejoy died in
1876. In 1878, the plaintiffs, who were grantees of Lovejoy's
adjoining land previously served by the aqueduct, filed a bill in
equity, praying that the defendants might be ordered to remove
the obstruction, and to restore the aqueduct to its usual and former
condition, and for an injunction against further obstruction, and
damages. The court dismissed the bill, saying that the clause
quoted from the deed must take effect "as a reservation, or by
U

1

107 Mass. 591 (1871).
26 Mass. 196 (1879).
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way of implied grant," since it would "vest in the grantor in the
deed some new right or interest not before existing in him." The
court said:
"The clause we are considering does not. merely reserve to
Lovejoy a right of way and of maintaining aqueduct logs
through the land granted. The privilege which the parties intended should invest in him was the right of passing and repassing, and of maintaining his aqueduct logs through a culvert
to be built and kept in repair by the grantee. The provision
that the grantee shall build and keep in repair the culvert is an
essential part of the grant, and clearly indicates that the intention of the parties was to confer upon the grantor a new right
not previously vested in him, and which, therefore, could not
be the subject of an exception."
The court then held that, to make a reservation effectual for
a longer time than the life of the grantor, words of limitation
were necessary.
In holding that the "right" claimed could not be the subject
of an exception, the court was right. During the common ownership, Lovejoy had no right that the defendants or anyone else
should build and keep in repair a culvert on his land. No such
legal incident was in esse at the time of his grant, which could
be withdrawn from the operation of the grant. Therefore if
Lovejoy had any such right, after the conveyance, it would have
to be by some means given to him by the grantee. By the English
rule this could be done only by a re-grant, and would require the
execution of the deed by the grantee. The Massachusetts court
said that it could be done by reservation, but that the reservation
must contain words of limitation to make the right last longer
than the grantor's life. Concerning this last statement, two
things should be noted. First, that this view is a remarkable expansion of the scope of a reservation, as has been hereinbefore
pointed out. Second, assuming that an easement is the proper
subject of a reservation, the court.was probably in error in holding that words of limitation, such as "heirs" were necessary to
make the easement last beyond the grantor's life. 6 Apparently
it is not necessary to use the word "heirs" in order to reserve
a rent in fee simple. But the cases involving casements, in jurisdictions allowing easements to be created by reservation, are in
17
conflict upon this question.
le 2 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, 2nd ed., § 362, p. 1269, citing Co. Litt. 47a;
2 PLATT LEASEs, 88; GILERT, RENTS, 64; Jacques v. Gould. 4 Cush. Mass.) 384.
17 Koehle v. Knecht, 99 Ill.396; Dawson v. Western Md. R. R. Co., 107 Md. 70,
14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337, 15 Ann. Cas. 678, 68 Atl. 301;
Bean v. French, 140 Mass. 239; Childs v. Boston & M. R. R., 213 Mass. 91, 99 N.
E. 957; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns (or.Y.) 73; Kister v. Rieser, 98 Pa. 1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1925

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1925], Art. 4
WEST VIEGINIA LAW

QUARTERLY

It should be observed that it has recently been called in question in England whether the word "heirs" has ever been necessary
to the valid creation of a durable easement by grant. 18 As to
the law in the American jurisdictions, a learned American writer 0
says:
"In this country it has occasionally been assumed that they
(words of limitation) are necessary for this purpose, .... "
The only actual decisions cited by the learned author are cases
of reservation of easements, and not of the grant of easements,
but it may be safely assumed that no court would require words of
limitation in a reservation, unless it required such words in a
grant. The reverse of this statement would not necessarily be
true, however.2 0
In Bean v. French, 21 Merrifield conveyed to Cobleigh a lot, "reserving however to myself the privilege of a bridle road in front of
the house."
Merrifield retained other land adjoining the lot
sold. Merrifield was dead and his adjoining land was now owned
by the defendant, who used the bridle path and was sued in
trespass by a successor in title of Cobleigh. It did not appear
whether or not the bridle path was used by Merrifield before his
conveyance to Cobleigh. Morton, C. J., held that the easement
expired with Merrifield's life, because no words of limitation were
inserted in the "reservation."
The learned Chief Justice said:
"When a clause in a deed is strictly an exception, taking
out of the grant some portion of the grantor's former estate,
as if one should convey his farm excepting the wood lot, the
part excepted would remain in the grantor as of his former
title, because not granted. But when the effect of the clause
is to create some right or easement not before existing, it is,
properly speaking, a reservation, and is generally considered as
operating by way of implied grant."
In the case at bar, Merrifield, while he was the owner of
the lots now held by the plaintiff and the defendant, had the
right to pass and repass over any part of his estate, but no right
of way, properly speaking, existed over the plaintiff's lot. This
easement or servitude in favor of the lot retained by Merrifield

is See an article by Charles Sweet, In 24 L. QUAE. Rzv. 26 at p. 28, in which he
states that English conveyancers have for generations been of the impression that
the word "heirs" is necessary.
But see 24 L. QuAlR. Rnv. 199, where Arthur
Underhill argues that the practice of inserting the word "heirs" has been followed
merely "ex abundanti cautela." And see 24 L. QuAi Rnv. 259, where Mr. Sweet
admits that Mr. Underhill is probably right, but says that the question is not fro
from doubt. See also WnLLiAMS ON vENDORs AND PUncHAsEns, p. 1110. Hewlins
v. Shippam, 5 B. and C. 221, at p. 228, contains a dictum to the effect that such words
are necessary.

Is TIFFANY ON REAL PsOPERTy, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, § 361 at p.

2

1259.

See "upra, n. 15.

2 140 Mass. 229 (1885).
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was a new interest in real estate, created by the reservation and its
acceptance by the grantee in the deed. As the reservation contains no words of inheritance, it follows, according to the authorities cited above, that Merrifield had only a life estate in the easement; and that the ruling of the Superior Court was correct.
The result of this case was a palpable violation of the intent
of the parties, which could easily have been avoided by following
the reasoning of the earlier ease of Bowen v. Conner22 and construing the words in question as words of exception, rendering
unnecessary the use of the word "heirs" to make the easement
durable.
In Wood v. Boyd,23 the question was, in substance, as follows:
A conveys Blackacre to B, but in the conveyance A reserves to the
owner (Q) of adjoining lands the right of passageway through
Blackacre, as the same is now enjoyed. C had, before this conveyance, an existing legal easement which was in use. The deed from
A to B also contained a covenant against incumbrances. B sued
A for the breach of the covenant, alleging the existence of C's
easement as a breach, and said:
"His (A's) deed contains a covenant that the granted premises are free from all incumbrances, and the question in this case
is, What are the granted premises? . .. "Construing the clause
in the plaintiff's deed as an exception, it qualifies and limits
the estate granted. 'The granted premises,' which are covenanted to be free from incumbrances is not the land in fee,
but the fee diminished by existing easements, which are excepted out of the grant. Such easements are not incumbrances upon
'the granted premises.' "
It will be observed that the court had no difficulty in thinking
of a conveyance of land as passing a large proportion of the legal
incidents which make up complete ownership, yet as leaving some
incidents entirely outside the scope of the conveyance, by the process of exception, so that the covenants in the deed did not attach
to the incidents left out, any more than the covenants in a deed
would attach to an acre of land expressly excepted out of the description in the deed.
In White v. New York, etc., Railroad Company,2" it appeared
that Partridge conveyed land to the Norfolk County Ry. Co., for
a railroad, "Reserving the passway at grade over said railroad
where now made."
Partridge retained land on both sides of
the railroad, which he later sold to Ware, who sold it to the plaina Supra, n. 6.
3 145 Mass. 176 (1887).
156 Mass. 181 (1892).

"
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tiff. Partridge died, and the defendant company, the successor
in title of the Norfolk company obstructed the way and attempted to justify its act on the ground that "Partridge could create
a perpetual easement only by a reservation in the nature of an
impiled grant, in which case the word 'heirs' was necessary, and
its omission was fatal. The court held, however, that the right
of way was excepted from the conveyance, and said:
"We think it is evident from the situation of the land, and
from the surrounding circumstances and those attending the giving of the deed, that it was the intention of the parties that
the passageway should be annexed as a perpetual right to the
larger tract. It was clear that the larger tract would be wholly
inaccessible unless Partridge and his successors in title were
to have the right to use this or some other way. The
way had been used before the railroad was laid out......
Whether, in a given case, the language shall be construed to
create an exception or a reservation, will depend upon the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances, in
the absence of a declaration in the deed by the parties of their
intention as to the nature of a way."
In this case it will be observed that the crossing had been used
before the railroad was laid out. It is fairly apparent from the
facts that the way was a way of necessity. Yet the court decided
the case on the assumption that the conveyance omitted, or excepted, some of the normal legal incidents of ownership, which therfore remained in the grantor.
Olaffin v. B. & A. R. R. Oo.,25 was a case in which P conveyed
to a railroad corporation a strip of land by a deed containing the
following clause:
"Reserving also to myself and my representatives forever the
right of passage, etc."
The railroad company obstructed the crossing, and the plaintiff,
who had succeeded to the ownership of P's land adjoining the
strip conveyed, brought an action of tort on account of the obstruction. The court held that the word "heirs" being omitted, a
reservation in fee was not created, and that the plaintiff had
P's rights; that these rights would cease on P's death, and that
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that P was
living. The court noticed the English rule that a right of way
could not be the subject of either an exception or reservation, but
said:
"In this Commonwealth, however, an easement may be created
by way of exception or reservation .....
If created by way of
=

157 Mass. 489 (1892).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss1/4

10

Madden: Creation of Easements by Exception
CBEATION

OF EASEMENTS

BY EXCEPTION

reservation, the word 'heirs' is necessary to create an easement
But if created by way of exception, the word
in fee ......
'heirs' is not necessary to create an easement in fee, if the grantor
.As an exowned the fee at the time of the conveyance .....
ception may be created by words of reservation, little reliance
can be placed upon the language used in determining whether
the right is by way of exception or by way of reservation."
The court says that since there was no evidence of an existing way
across the land, "the right of way must be taken to have been
acquired by way of reservation and not by way of exception."
The court took the view that the case was concluded by Bean v.
French,28 although the court in that case does not notice the question of whether there was an existing way in the sense of a user
by the owner of both tracts of a particular route for passage before the severance, or not. In fact, it would seem fairly inferable
from, the report of Bean v. French that there was such a user, and
that Chief Justice Morton, in his statement that there was no
existing way, had reference to a legal right in the lands of another, and not to a mere physical user.
Here again we find an able court defeating the plainly expressed
intent of the parties by an unreasoned decision based upon a fact
that would seem to have been both logically and legally immaterial.
In Hamlin v. Neu England Railroad Company,27 A, in 1851
conveyed a strip of land to the defendant railroad corporation
"reserving the right to cross the track of said railroad on grade
near the westerly line of our said lands at such place as said
company can most conveniently provide, said crossing to be made
with cattle guards on the sides and maintained at the expense of
said company. The railroad company established a crossing at a
place substantially identical with a cart path which had formerly
been used by A, the owner, in crossing the land. The grantor, A,
died. The railroad company obstructed the crossing, preventing
A's successor in title of the land benefitted by the crossing from
using it, whereupon they sued in tort for the obstruction. The
court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, and, in the course of the
opinion, said:
"The grantors except from the grant, and retain as of their
former estate, the perpetual right of crossing the railroad by the
present cart path or way, and the grantee on its part agrees to
plank and maintain the crossing, and make and keep cattle
guards, and shall have the privilege of removing the crossing
20 Supra, n. 21.

9T 160 Mass. 459.
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to a more convenient spot, not destroying the identity of the
path as a way,' '-then the right of crossing was, without interruption, and as of their former estate, in the grantors, and never
sprang from any implied contract or grant of the railroad company, although new incidents not essential to it were annexed
to it by the implied contract. Such a construction of the clause
does violence neither to the language used nor to the intention of the parties, when the words are read and the intention
is sought in the light of the circumstances under which the deed
was made. The crossing having been already constructed by the
railroad company at a place substantially identical with that
where the old way or cart path crossed its location, it cannot
reasonably be contended that the providing of a place, the planking of the crossing, or the making of cattle guards became, by
the delivery of the deed, conditions precedent to the further
use of the crossing by the grantors."
The fact that the location of the crossing was not required by
the deed to be on the route of the old cart path, and that the
crossing was in fact laid out only "substantially identical" with
the old way, was disposed of by the court in the following language:
"The possible change of the place of crossing was merely a
privilege given the railroad company to deal with a portion of
the grantor's estate which they had not granted ....
"
The Ashcroft Case2 8 was distinguished on the ground that in the
Hamlin Case the right of the grantors to cross was independent of
the agreement of the railroad to maintain the crossing and cattle
guards at its own expense, while in the Ashcroft Case the right
of crossing could only be exercised in and through a culvert to be
built and maintained by the railroad company. Presumably in
the Hamlin Case there would be no duty on the railroad company
to maintain the crossing, but only to permit the plaintiffs to cross.
The case seems plainly right, but the distinction between this case
and the previous ones, except the Ashcroft Case in which the intent of the parties was defeated, is not satisfactory.
In Simpson et al. v. Boston & Maine Railroad,21 the plaintiff
filed a bill in equity to restrain the defendant from obstructing a
crossing. The plaintiffs had-inherited land from, Jesse Simpson,
who had conveyed a strip of land, adjoining the land now owned
by the plaintiffs, to the predecessor in title of the railroad, "reserving a crossing or right of way to be maintained and kept in
repair at the expense of said railroad corporation" at a specified
location. Jesse Simpson had crossed the land conveyed to the
2

Ashcroft v. Eastern Railroad, 126 Mass. 196 (1878),
176 Mass. 359 (1900).
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railroad, before the conveyance but at no particular location, until after the deed to the railroad was made. During Jesse Simpson's life and for many years after his death, the crossing specified
in the deed was used, and then the defendant railroad closed it.
The court held that the clause quoted above could not constitute
an exception because "it was a new right of way," and that as a
reservation, it expired at the death of Jesse Simpson, for want of
the word "heirs" in the reservation. The bill was dismissed.
In the case of Walker Ice Company v. American Steel & Wire
Company, 0 A leased to B, a manufacturing company, an artificial
pond "to be used for flowage purposes only .... with the exclusive right to flow, store and use water in said pond." The lease
contained the following clause:
"The said lessor for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, reserves the exclusive right to cut, harvest,
sell or store for sale, ice"
from the pond in question. The lease was an indenture. A question
arose as to whether the lessee's right to flow hot water from its
factory into the pond, and destroy the ice was superior to the
lessor's right to cut ice from the pond. The majority of the
court held that the right of the lessor to cut ice was the superior
right, saying:
"The reservation is in the nature of an exception and should
be so construed."
The court apparently made this observation, in order to escape
tfia doctrine that a deed should be construed most strongly against
the grantor. Presumably the argument would be that if the
privRege of cutting ice is excepted out of the operation of the
deed, then the deed does not touch it, and consequently rules of
construction applicable to a deed are not applicable to this language. This reasoning seems unsound, as is ably shown by Loring,
J., in his dissenting opinion."' But it shows that the court could
think of a conveyance which would pass most of the legal incidents
of ownership in the land, but leave untouched other incidents which
[0 185 Mass. 463 (1904).
M "But in determining whether the right retained by a grantor is superior to
the grant or subordinate to it,it makes no difference whether the deed by which
an easement is retained in the grantor operates by way of exception or by way of
a grant back from the grantee, which is usually spoken of as a reservation. The
correlative rights of an abutter on a railroad and of the railroad company in a
private way over the railroad location are precisely the same, whether the deed
retaining in the abutter a right to use the private way operates by way of exception or by way of reservation. The general rule of construction Is equally applicable in both cases, that a deed shall be construed against the grantor, Ashley v.
Pease, 18 Pick. 268, 275; Palmer v. Evangelical Baptist Benevolent & Missionary
Society, 166 Mass. 143; and that what is retained by the grantor shall be construed so as not to be repugnant to the grant. Py chon v. Stearns, 11 Mec. 304,
312. Dexter v. Manley, 4 Cush. 14, 25. Corbin v. Hea2y, 20 Pick. 514," Loring J.,
dissenting, 185 Mass. at 481.
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were excepted from the conveyance. The clause in question could
have been construed as one of reservation without limiting its
duration since words of limitation were used. It could have been
construed as a clause of re-grant, since the leave was an indenture.
In the case of Baffey v. Agawam National Bank," Moore conveyed to Henry a lot, the deed containing this language:
"A passageway is to be kept open and for use in common between the two houses, ten feet in width, five feet of said passageway to be furnished by said Henry and five feet by me from land
lying east of the land here conveyed."
There was no passageway in existence at the time of the deed. In
an action for breach of a covenant against incumbrances between
successors in title of Henry, the question of whether the right to
the passageway had continued beyond the life of the grantor,
Moore, became material. Loring J., speaking for the court, said
that it was the plain intent of the parties to create a passageway
in perpetuity; and if the court construed the clause quoted above,
as one of reservation, that intent would fail for want of the "heirs"
in the clause; that the clause could not operate by way of exception,
"because it is a new way not existing in-law or in fact (that is to
say, physically on the ground) at the date of the conveyance."
The learned judge then holds that the clause in question constituted a valid contract between the parties to the deed, binding in
equity upon purchasers with notice from the original grantee,
Henry, in perpetuity. The doctrine of equitable servitudes or restrictions was invoked, the learned judge saying:
"The so called equitable restriction results from the fact that
equity will enforce the agreement against those taking with
notice, in favor of the then owner of the land to be benefitted."
The court held that the covenant against incumbrances had been
breached. The learned judge explains why this beneficent doctrine had not been applied in the earlier Massachusetts cases,
by stating that in the Claflin Case"' the action was in tort for
obstructing a right of way, which action would not lie unless there
was a legal easement; that in the Simpson Case 34 there was nothing
to-show that the "reservation" was intended to be perpetual. The
Ashcroft Case35 was more troublesome, however. Concerning that
case, the learned judge said:
190 Mass. 20, ,76 N. E. 449, 3 U. R. A. (N. S.) 98, 112 Am. St. Rep. 296
(1906).
3 Ciaflin, etc., supra, n. 24.
34 Simpson et atl.
Boston & Maine R. R., supra, n. 28.
= Ashcroft v. Eastern R. R., supra, n. 16.
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"We need not now determine whether that case is to be distinguished on the ground that the doctrine now laid down was not
then contended for, or is to be supported on the ground that the
court will not help out a conveyance defective for lack of the
It is
word 'heirs,' by letting it operate as an agreement.
settled that the word 'agree' may be read 'grant,' and an
'agreement under seal' construed to be a 'grant.'
Hogan v.
Barry, 143 Mlass. 538, 10 N. E. 253; Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass.
585, 24 N. E. 858, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481. But it is another matter to hold that what is defective as a grant is valid as an agreement, where the parties have undertaken to make a grant. As
we have said, that need not be determined now."
Upon the question of whether that which is in form a conveyance
can be construed as a contract to convey, if it fulfills the requisites
of a contract, but fails to meet the requisites of a grant, there
should be no serious doubt. The well recognized doctrine that an
unsealed deed may be the basis of a suit in equity for specific
performance, on the ground that the deed constitutes a contract
to convey the land, would seem to be quite analagous. 3- Doubtless the first ground of distinction advanced by the court, viz.,
that the doctrine of equitable servitudes did not occur to counsel
nor court in the Ashcroft Case,' 7 is the true one.
In Foster v. Smith,'8 the doctrine that where there is an existing
way in use by the common owner, it may be made the subject of
an exception, and hence will be permanent without the use of the
word "heirs" was again applied.
In (hiTds v. Boston & M. R. R.,19 the facts were that in 1846
David Childs conveyed land to a railroad company by a deed
containing this language:
"And it is understood and agreed that the said company are
to make me a good and sufficient crossing for carting across
said railroad near my bar place, or such other place as we can
agree upon. "
No crossing existed at this time, but one was made later, which
was used until 1907, when it was closed by the defendant company, the successor in title of the original grantee. The plaintiffs
were successors in title to David Childs' land adjoining the rail
road, and they sued at law for the obstruction. The defendant
contended that the right of crossing had expired upon the death
of David Childs, the original grantor. The court held that the
clause quoted above could not operate by way of exception "be-

8 See HoLm~s, COmmON LAW, 393, 403
7 Supra, n. 16.
D9 211 Mass. 497. 98 N. E. 693 (1912).
e 213 Mass. 91, 99 N. E. 957, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378 (1914).
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cause it ereated a new right of way before used or existing, the
burden of fashioning which was placed upon the railroad company;" that because the word "heirs" was not used it could operate as a reservation only for the life of David Childs; that because
it was not sealed by the grantee it was not a technical "covenant
running with the land" hence no one could sue upon it as a contract, except the original parties. But the court found an intent that
the right of crossing should be permanent, and that an equitable
servitude was created, as in the case of Bailey v. Agawam4 National
Bank," which, in a suit in equity, would be protected, and damages
given for its violation. But since the actual proceeding was an action at law, the plaintiffs failed. The court suggested that the
plaintiff might amend into a suit in equity, and succeed there.
We have reviewed the decisions in an enlightened jurisdiction
and we submit that they leave the law in needless and intolerable
confusion. The intent of the parties has been defeated oftener
than it has been upheld, in spite of an apparent effort on the
part of the court to fulfill that intent, even by stretching the
law. The obstacle has been faulty analysis. If the courts of
Massachusetts had carried the idea suggested in Bowen v. Conner"
that a pre-existing right could be excepted out of the operation of
a conveyance, to its logical conclusion instead of stopping at the
wholly irrelevant question of whether or not there was a preexisting user, every case reported in the Massachusetts reports
would have been decided in accordance with the intent of the
parties, except possibly the Asheroft Case. 42 Even in that case
a partial fulfillment of the parties' intent would have been possible. And in no case would it have been necessary to "go into
equity," and become involved in the uncertainties and confusions
of equitable restrictions and servitudes.
The Massachusetts doctrine that a user of the easement during
the common ownership will make it the proper subject of an exception when a severance occurs, doubtless had its origin in the
doctrine that, under certain circumstances, a so called quasieasement exercised by the common owner of two tracts over one of
the tracts for the benefit of the other is converted into a true
easement by the sale of the quasi-dominant tract. This doctrine
is ordinarily limited to situations in which the quasi-easement is
apparent and continuous and highly convenient to the quasi-domS upra, n. 61.
Bupra, n. 6.
42

SuPra, n.

14.
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inant estate. 43 The quasi-easement must be in actual existence at
the time of the separation in .order to be converted into a true
easement because the doctrine is that a grant is implied from the
probable intent of the parties that the easement should go with
the land for the benefit of which it was formerly used. Of course,
there would be no basis for such an implication unless there
should actually have been a user before the severance of the two
estates. Therefore the fact of a previous user is always significant in the cases involving the question of an implied grant. 4"
In these cases the pre-existing user creates an appearance of a
valuable appurtenance to the land sold, which the vendee thinks
he is getting with the land and without which he probably would
not buy the land. Hence the law supplements the terms of the
conveyance by this implication of a grant.
In the cases where there is an express reservation or exception,
however, nothing hinges upon the appearances at the time of the
conveyance. The intent of the parties as to what should pass
by the conveyance, and what should remain in the grantor, are
perfectly plain. The only question is, whether under the legal
requirements of conveyancing, that intent can be made effective.
The purely physical, and legally unimportant fact of whether the
privilege which the common owner had before the conveyance, was
exercised by him, would seem to have nothing to do with that
question.
42 See e. g., Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287 (1878); Wheeldon v. Burrows, L. R.
12 Ch. D. 31 (1879).
" See T'wnw'A, Rz&A PzOPRT, 2nd ed.. 1 263, for a learae
d amseloa of
the doctrine of Implied grants as related to easement.
See also GALe Oa&"WMXTS, 9th ed., page 153 and following.
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